An Application of Quantum Networks for Secure Video Surveillance by Alan Mink et al.
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
6 
An Application of Quantum Networks  
for Secure Video Surveillance  
Alan Mink, Lijun Ma, Barry Hershman and Xiao Tang  
National Institute of Standards and Technology,  
USA 
1. Introduction    
Security is an increasingly growing concern for network communications and video is an 
emerging segment of network traffic that uses large amounts of bandwidth. Streaming 
video, vs. downloading a video for later viewing, requires a continuous, high data rate. The 
data rate will vary depending on the quality of the video. Video surveillance is a streaming 
video application that in addition may require securing the data stream to prevent others 
from viewing it as well as prevent any tampering of that video stream.  
There are two parts to secure communication, key distribution and ciphers. A cipher 
requires a secret key that is used to encrypt data (plaintext), transforming it into an 
unreadable form (ciphertext) and then to decrypt it back into its original form. Key 
distribution is the method used to exchange the secret key between the desired end users 
and no one else. Current block ciphers are relatively slow compared to existing bandwidth 
because they require a substantial amount of processing that must compete for CPU cycles 
with the video encoding and compression processing. Frequently changing keys is thought 
to increase security, but the public key exchange method requires even more processing 
than the cipher.  Cipher and key exchange processing can be off-loaded from the CPU, when 
the communication end point is the other end of the link, by using dedicated hardware 
called a link encryptor.  
Current classical security algorithms are based on the perceived computational complexity 
of certain mathematical functions and have not been proved secure. The public key 
algorithm is at risk from future quantum computers, whereas block ciphers are only 
weakened and an easy fix is to double the length of the key. Both are constantly at risk from 
a potential break through algorithm. Communications channels that exploit properties 
unique to quantum systems have been shown to enable functionality that cannot be 
achieved by classical means.  If a high level of security is deemed necessary for the video 
stream, one might consider the use of a One-Time-Pad cipher [Wikipedia 2010], the only 
provably secure cipher, along with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), also a provably 
secure method of exchanging the secret keys used by a cipher. 
QKD is a protocol based on the quantum laws of physics and is provably information 
theoretically secure to accomplish key distribution [Gisin, et al., 2002]. QKD keys, when 
used with a One-Time-Pad cipher, can provide secure communications. A One-Time-Pad 
cipher algorithm performs an Exclusive OR (XOR) on a random secret key and the message. 
This is a simple operation that incurs little overhead compared to the more common 
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computationally intensive ciphers, but it requires the key to be the same length as the 
message and discarded once used. For video, that requires a continuous stream of random 
secret keys, which is one of the features of QKD. Because of that feature, QKD is considered 
to have a long-term security perspective because of its “perfect forward security” attribute. 
The term perfect forward security means that any compromised keys cannot be used to 
determine other keys, either past or future. Since QKD keys are random strings and are not 
produced by a mathematical function, any compromised keys cannot be used to determine 
other keys. 
QKD is still a technology under development even though a few commercial systems are 
available [Ouellette, 2004]. Some of the limitations of QKD are speed, distance and cost. 
Distance is a major concern, since without a break-through in developing a quantum 
repeater the quantum signal is limited to a few 100 km at best. Amplification is not possible 
since the quantum “no cloning law” specifies that a quantum state cannot be copied. If 
trusted, intermediate nodes are acceptable, then longer distances are possible via a multi-
hop propagation of the key over multiple QKD links. This is not always acceptable and for 
these situations a quantum repeater would be required. It is currently under development, 
but none have yet been demonstrated. Speed, the ability to produce secure keys at a high 
rate is important to cope with the large amount of communication traffic over high-speed 
connections and hardware implementations that off-load the CPU have been demonstrated. 
Cost is an ever-present constraint and designs that use lower cost components and share 
rather than replicate components reduce the cost. In some cases, designs that share rather 
than duplicate components help to reduce concerns of side channel attacks upon engineered 
components (vs theoretical ones), but usually at the detriment of speed. 
This chapter includes a short summary of the BB84 QKD protocol and its various stages. We 
then present a section on the configuration of a QKD system targeted for short distances and 
how a number of innovations lowered the cost and evolved that core design for longer 
distance communication and current infrastructure use. Another section will discuss 
hardware support for the data handling necessary to implement high-speed QKD. 
Extending QKD point-to-point systems to form QKD networks makes it even more 
attractive for applications such as video surveillance and we will discuss early networking 
demonstrations. In closing, we will discuss initial QKD standards efforts currently being 
conducted 
2. BB84 protocol 
The basic QKD protocol is known as BB84 [Bennet & Brassard, 1984] and has evolved into a 
family of protocols as researchers experiment with various approaches within a common 
framework. The BB84 protocol consists of four stages, see Fig 1. The first stage is the 
transmission of a randomly encoded quantum information stream between Alice (the 
initiator) and Bob (the responder) through an unsecured public link (called the quantum 
channel) to establish the raw key. The quantum information stream consists of quantum 
bits, called “qubits”. Photons are used for qbits because light travels well over distances 
while atoms are better for storage, as in quantum memory, because they are easier to hold in 
one place. This is the most technically challenging stage of the protocol and has inspired 
many variations. Horizontal-vertical and diagonal states of photon polarization are a pair of 
quantum states that cannot be precisely measured simultaneously and are common 
candidates for QKD. For example, Alice sends each photon set in one of the four linear 
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polarization states: horizontal-vertical (belonging to the horizontal-vertical basis) or +/- 45 
degree diagonal (belonging to the diagonal basis).  One of the polarization states in each 
basis represents a “0” bit value and the other a “1”. Alice keeps a temporary database of the 
state of all photons sent. Bob randomly chooses to measure each photon in either the 
horizontal-vertical or diagonal basis. Since there is only a single photon, Bob can only do a 
single measurement. If Bob chooses correctly, the value he measures will be correct. If he 
chooses incorrectly, the value he measures will be random.  
 
 
Fig. 1. QKD protocol flow with a Key Manager Application Interface 
The remaining stages of the protocol are conducted over an unsecured public link, called the 
classical channel (this can be any conventional communications channel). The classical 
channel may be implemented as multiple physical and/or logical channels (e.g., multiple IP 
sockets for the different protocol stages). The QKD messages sent over them must be 
authenticated (integrity protected) to prevent tampering, although encryption is not needed 
since secrecy is unnecessary. The second stage is sifting, where Bob sends a list to Alice of 
photons detected and how they were measured (basis), but not their measured value. Alice 
retrieves, from her temporary database, only those entries measured by Bob in the correct 
basis and sends this list back to Bob (without their values), informing Bob which of his 
measurements were correct. Bob only keeps those entries on Alice’s list. Alice and Bob now 
have a list of ordered random bits called sifted-keys. These two lists are the same length 
and, in theory should be identical. However, in practice the lists have some errors between 
them called quantum bit errors. The quantum bit error rate (QBER) may be caused by 
ordinary communication noise, but may also be a potential indication of eavesdropping. The 
eavesdropper is commonly called Eve. If the QBER is low enough, the protocol proceeds to 
the next stage. If the QBER gets too high the protocol cannot be sure that Eve’s information 
is limited and the current group of sifted-key is discarded.  
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The third stage is reconciliation to correct these errors. Cascade [Nakassis, et al., 2004], and 
its variants, is the predominant reconciliation algorithm that exchanges parity and error 
correcting codes to reconcile errors without exposing the key values. This process requires a 
number of communications between Bob and Alice and results in a list smaller than the 
sifted list, since some of the keys are discarded to reduce any information Eve may glean 
from these exchanges. Niagara [Elliot, et al., 2005] is another algorithm that is based on a 
low-density parity check method and requires a single exchange between Bob and Alice.  
The fourth stage is privacy amplification, which computes a new (even smaller) set of bits 
from the reconciled set of bits using a hashing algorithm and requires no communication 
between Alice and Bob. The purpose of privacy amplification is to significantly reduce any 
information that Eve may have acquired from this protocol. Unless Eve knows all or most of 
the original bits, she will not be able to compute the new set.  
A simplified version of BB84 that reduces complexity, called B92 [Bennett, 1992], uses only 
two nonorthogonal quantum states, but is considered less secure and is used mostly in R&D 
to evaluate different QKD implementations and only focuses on stage 1 and 2 of the 
protocol. 
A conventional threat model assumes Eve intercepts the photons, measures them and 
generates new photons based on those measurements, which are sent to Bob. From this 
attack, Eve will introduce on average a 25% QBER in the raw key that Bob recovers.  Even 
using other more complex attacks that involve entanglement, Eve still cannot eavesdrop 
successfully to obtain the keys without introducing a detectable QBER in the raw key. 
Furthermore, privacy amplification can be strengthened to compensate for these attacks 
when the QBER is within acceptable bounds. Attacks that focus on side channels and the 
reality of engineered (vs theoretical) components [Scarani & Kurtsiefer, 2009; Xu, et al., 2010] 
are a concern for all security measures.  
3. A high speed QKD system 
We present, as an example, our design of a high speed QKD system. This system was 
designed for high-speed, short distance communication (< 10 km) and (relatively) low cost. 
It can operate over a free-space or fiber optic quantum channel.  This system uses Vertical-
Cavity Surface-Emitting Lasers (VCSELs) for attenuated photon sources, silicon avalanche 
photo diodes (Si-APDs) for detectors and a pair of custom printed circuit boards (PCBs) 
[Mink, et al., 2006] to process the QKD protocol data at a continuous high data rate to create 
a shared sifted-key. A fiber based QKD design is shown in Fig. 2. This system operates the 
quantum channel at 850 nm and the classical channel in the standard 1550 nm 
telecommunication range. Both channels operate at the same synchronized 1.25 GHz rate.  
Si-APDs are relatively low cost single photon detectors that operate at room temperature in 
a free running mode with a relatively high quantum efficiency (QE) of about 70% for the 
optimal wavelength. We chose 850 nm for the quantum channel because it’s one of the 
(older) standard telecommunication wavelengths and thus has commercially available 
components, even though it’s not the optimal wavelength for QE. Also 850 nm is a good 
short-range wavelength for both free-space and fiber optic transmission. We also chose 
polarization as the quantum property to encode information on single photons. This is 
common in QKD. In free-space, the polarization of light doesn’t change, although it does in 
fiber optics and that requires additional handling to compensate for externally caused 
distortion.  
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of our BB84 fiber-based QKD system; VCSEL: vertical-cavity 
surface-emitting lasers; Pol.: polarizer; VOA: variable optical attenuator; NPBS, non-
polarizing beam splitter; P.C.: polarization controller; FPGA: custom printed circuit board 
controlled by a field-programmable gate array; PCI: PCI bus; PBS: polarizing beam splitter; 
Solid line: optical fiber; Dotted line: electric cable 
Two commercial 1.25 Gb/s course wavelength division multiplexing transceivers form the 
bi-directional classical communication channel operating at 1510 nm and 1590 nm. Bob’s 
PCB recovers Alice’s clock from the classical channel, allowing it to synchronize with Alice. 
The clock frequency dictates the resolution of a detection event time bin. Synchronized, 
aligned time bins are important because the QKD protocol requires Alice and Bob to 
communicate about specific photons and a way to identify them is by labeling their 
occurrence in time. The concept is to treat each detector output as a serial data stream and 
search it for a rising edge (a 0-to-1 transition) indicating a single photon detection event. The 
bit position in that data stream is the time bin. These time bins can be aligned between Alice 
and Bob by correlating events in the classical channel to events in the quantum channel.  
Alice’s PCB generates an 800 ps electrical pulse every 1600 ps (625 MHz) on the randomly 
selected quantum output. Each of the four outputs drives a 10 Gbit/s 850 nm VCSEL that 
generates a laser pulse. The intensity of the laser pulse is then attenuated by variable optical 
attenuators (VOA) to the single photon level. A linear polarizer and a half-wave plate 
(HWP) sets the polarization orientation, -45º, +45 º, 0º or 90 º, that corresponds to the output 
path. These four output streams are combined into a single stream by non-polarizing beam-
splitters (NPBSs) and sent to Bob over the quantum channel. The mean photon number, μ, at 
Alice’s output is set to 0.1, therefore on average, Alice emits one photon every ten pulses.  
At Bob, a 1 x 2 non-polarizing single-mode fiber coupler performs a random choice of 
polarization basis measurement. After the coupler, a polarization compensation module 
recovers the photon’s polarization state and a polarizing beam-splitter (PBS) separates the 
photons by their polarization directing them to a Si-APD that feeds Bob’s PCB.  This process 
separates the photons into four paths, corresponding to the four BB84 encoding states. A 
photon measured in the wrong basis would be randomly detected as a “0” or “1”. 
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Polarization compensation is needed continuously for a fiber-based system. Initially, and 
periodically, Bob cooperates with Alice to recover the photon’s polarization state that may 
change during transmission through the fiber. We developed two types of active 
polarization controllers [Franson and Jacobs, 1995] for a polarization recovery and auto-
compensation subsystem [Ma, et al, 2006], since it avoids back-scattering issues of passive 
polarization controllers [Stucki, et al., 2002]. One type uses liquid crystal retarders (LCR) 
and the other type uses Piezo Polarization Controllers (PZ), see Fig 3. We chose the PZ 
controller over the LCR because the PZ is faster (30 μs vs 100 ms), it doesn’t need to be 
aligned with the PBS, it’s fiber based with virtually no insertion loss and it can achieve an 
arbitrary transformation. The disadvantages of the PZ controller are it may drift slowly and 
it exhibits poor repeatability that results in additional search time.  
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Fig. 3. Two active polarization recovery and auto-compensation (PRAC) subsystem: (a) 
Liquid Crystal Retardance and (b) Piezo Polarization Controllers. 
These controllers maximize the polarization extinction ratio, which is the ratio of the correct 
photon counts to the incorrect counts in a compatible measurement basis. For example, the 
ratio between the counts of the two output ports of the PBS when a photon stream of all the 
same polarization is sent. The algorithm that controls these subsystems does a coarse-step 
search to find the optimal area and then a fine-step search in that area to find the optimal 
point. This procedure is run at startup and then invoked periodically or when the QBER 
increases. 
A practical QKD system must be able to use existing fiber infrastructure. We have devised a 
technique that allows 850 nm single photons to share standard telecom fiber, SMF-28, with 
telecom traffic. Since the cutoff wavelength of SMF-28 fiber is much longer than 850 nm, 
some higher order transverse modes (LP11 mode) exist in the fiber and travel slightly slower 
than the fundamental mode (2.3 ns/km delay). Also its polarization state is different than 
the fundamental mode. At high data rates, when the detection time bin is small this higher 
order pulse can occur in an adjacent time bin, see Fig. 4(a), and be erroneously detected 
causing an increase in the QBER. Fusion splicing a short piece of HI780 fiber to the end of 
the SMF-28 fiber functions as a spatial filter and partially filters the higher order mode pulse 
[Townsend, 1998; Gordon, et al., 2004], see Fig. 4(b), allowing the 850 nm quantum channel 
to successfully coexist with 1550 nm traffic on standard telecom fiber.  
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(a)                                                                              (b) 
Fig. 4. A photon detection histogram of our 850 nm quantum channel over 1 km of 1550 nm 
single-mode fiber (SMF28): (a) no splice and (b) ≈40 cm of HI780 fusion-spliced at fiber end.  
The quantum channel has a high loss. It is common to only detect a few photons for each 
1000 attempts to generate them. Because attenuated sources generate photons based on a 
Poisson distribution and the intention is to minimize any multi-photon generation, a typical 
mean photon number, μ, of 0.1 is used. These results in nothing generated ≈89% of the time, 
one photon generated ≈10% and more than 1 photon generated ≈1%. Thus there is a ≈90% 
loss right at the source. Normal attenuation applies to the photons in the transmission 
medium and additional loss is encountered at detectors. In addition to the detector QE, 
which indicates the percent of photons detected vs. the number that actually arrive, there is 
also the detector dead time. After an APD detects a photon, the avalanche process generates 
an electrical output signal. The device then needs a certain amount of time (dead time) to 
recover to its initial operational state for detection of the next photon. During this dead time, 
the bias voltage across the p-n junction of the APD is below the breakdown level and no 
photon can be detected [Ghioni, et al., 2003]. Our Si-APD has a QE of ≈45% at 850 nm, 
InGaAs APDs (another common QKD detector) tend to have a QE of ≈10% while other types 
of detectors can have a QE as low as ≈1%. 
Two important performance metrics of a QKD system are the secure key generation rate and 
QBER. Sifted-key rate is related to secure key rate and is a common metric used to evaluate 
the first two stages of a QKD system. Fig. 5 shows the measured sifted-key rate and the 
QBER at two quantum transmission rates, 625 Mbit/s and 312.5 Mbit/s, and two fiber 
lengths, 1 km and 4 km. Demonstrating this system can provide more than 4 Mbit/s of 
sifted-key over a 1 km of fiber with a mean photon number of 0.1. However, due to the 
relative high attenuation of 850 nm light in optical fiber, the sifted-key rate decreases 
quickly (logarithmically linear) as the distance increases, to about 1 Mbit/s at 4 km. 
Environmental QBER in our system is mainly caused by the following factors: (1) Si-APD 
dark count rate and light leakage, (2) cross-talk caused by an imperfect polarization 
extinction ratio, (3) timing jitter and (4) high order mode noise. Dark counts are caused by a 
thermo-initiated avalanche process in the APD and unexpected photon detection. They are 
independent of the transmission rate and for our system are on the order of 200 per second. 
With proper light sealing and filtering, the counts can be reduced to a few tens per second. 
Compared to our Mbits/s detection rate, this factor is negligible. The polarization extinction 
ratio was measured to be between 23 dB  to 28 dB, resulting in a contribution of about 1/3 of 
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the QBER and is independent of the transmission rate. Timing jitter also limits the 
transmission rate. Timing jitter is mostly caused by the original optical pulse width, its jitter 
and the timing jitter of the APD.  Our optical pulse width is 800 ps (FWHM), and the jitter of 
the APDs is measured at about 180 ps (FWHM). We also observed APD count-dependent 
jitter [Gordon, et al., 2005] and VCSEL data-dependent jitter [Guenter & Tatum, 1998] 
during transmission of randomly encoded photons.  Because of this jitter, our detection 
window is limited to 1.6 ns.  Narrowing our detection window results in a higher QBER. 
High order mode noise contributes about 1/3 of the QBER after filtering. All of these factors 
yield a QBER for our QKD system of about 2% to 3%. High order mode noise and photon 
attenuation do slightly increase the QBER at 4 km compared to 1 km. 
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Fig. 5. The system performance of our 850 nm QKD system at 625 MHz and 312.5 MHz. 
There are other variations for BB84 implementations that we briefly mention here. “One-
way weak coherent pulse“ QKD [Gisin , et al., 2002] uses polarization (as we’ve shown 
above) or phase encoding of quantum information on single photons sent from Alice to Bob. 
Plug-and-play QKD [Muller, et al., 1997] is where Bob sends a relatively strong, 
orthogonally-polarized pair of light pulses to Alice, who modulates their relative phase, 
attenuates them to single-photon levels, and reflects them back to Bob. The relative phase of 
the amplitude pulses carries the quantum information to Bob. Using free-space [Bienfang, et 
al., 2004] as the medium (vs. fiber) eliminates the need for polarization control, but adds the 
need for the acquisition, pointing, and tracking of the photon path between moving 
platforms, Alice and Bob. Even stationary buildings are moving due to vibration, wind and 
thermal expansion but optical communication telescopes exist to handle these problems. 
Satellites are the ultimate targets. The generation of two or more photons in a pulse used in 
a quantum link poses an opportunity for information to be obtained by an eavesdropper. 
On-going work continues to build a source that will generate single photons on demand 
[Granger, et al., 2004]. Using a source to generate entangled photon pairs [Ling, et al., 2008], 
one sent to Alice and one to Bob, is another approach that both eliminates multi-photon 
concerns and the need for a random number generator, since each entangled pair produced 
is randomly encoded and independent from each other. Currently, generating entangled 
photon pairs is a relatively slow process. Continuous variable QKD [Fossier, 2009] encodes 
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small deviations of the phase, amplitude, or polarization of a bright optical pulse. The 
difficulty is in measuring the received data and determining a state when the variance is 
comparable with the shot noise limit. 
3.1 Reducing the number of detectors 
Our high speed 850 nm QKD system uses four Si-APDs, which is the most expensive device 
in the QKD systems. To reduce the cost and reduce potential side channel attacks of our 
QKD system, we introduce a detection-time-bin-shift (DTBS) scheme [Breguet, et al., 1994] 
that projects the measurements into separate time-bins, rather than separate detectors. The 
disadvantage is the quantum transmission rate is reduced, resulting in proportionately 
reduced key rates. DTBS schemes can also eliminate side channel concerns caused by self-
synchronizing detectors and variations between detector efficiencies. However, when gated 
mode detectors are used in DTBS schemes, a time-bin-shift (TBS) intercept-resend attack 
might exploit a side channel and countermeasures should be adopted. 
The original DTBS scheme, Fig. 6(a), uses two couplers, each adding a 3 dB loss. In the 
enhanced scheme, Fig. 6(b), we replace the second coupler with a PBS. A passive coupler 
performs a random choice of measuring polarization and projects the results onto a short (0° 
basis) or long (45° basis) delay path resulting in the photon arriving in one of two adjacent 
time bins. In the short path, the polarization state of the photon is unchanged and is 
recorded in the first time bin. In the long path, the photon is delayed by one time bin and the 
polarization state of the photon is rotated by 45° and is recorded in the second time bin. The 
photons on these two paths are combined using a PBS, thus avoiding a 3 dB loss from a 
second coupler, and then fed to a single detector. Our scheme of Fig. 6(b) can be further 
extended to handle all four BB84 states as shown in Fig. 6(c), whereas the original scheme of 
Fig. 6(a) cannot. By adding another PBS and another pair of paths as well as changing the 
initial delay to a two time bin delay, we now can map the photon state to one of four time 
bins. Thus we need to reduce the photon transmission rate by four. The upper path is now a 
two time bin delay, and thus a photon traversing that path will be detected in time bin two 
or three, depending on the path it follows in the second pair of paths. The lower path is still 
a zero time bin delay and thus a photon traversing that path will be detected in time bin 
zero or one depending on the path it follows in the second pair of paths. Using a DTBS 
scheme requires only one quantum stream to be aligned to the classical channel, rather than 
multiple ones. Also during sifting, Bob and Alice must use the transmission clock windows 
to identify photons, not the DTBS time bins, otherwise the QKD protocol remains 
unchanged.  
Self synchronizing sequences can occur when dead time makes detectors temporarily 
unavailable, which can result in repeating detector firing order, for example, using two 
detectors for “0” and “1”, respectively. Once one detector has been fired, it becomes 
unavailable for the duration of its dead time. In a high photon transmission rate system 
there is a high probability that the other detector will fire before the first detector recovers. If 
this sequence of one detector being dead while the other detector fires continues, it results in 
strings of 1010... . Runs of such strings reduce the randomness of the keys and degrade the 
security of the QKD system. In our QKD system with 50 ns dead time and a transmission 
rate of 1.25 GHz, there are 62 (800 ps) time bins for a photon to arrive at the other detector 
while the first is in its dead time. Because of the quantum channel losses, the 10% emission 
rate, μ=0.1, of the sources and the QE=45% of the detector, the expected number of photons 
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arriving in this duration is three. BB84, 4-detector systems suffer from the same problem 
[Rogers, et al., 2007]. One solution is to disable all detectors once one detector has fired until 
the dead time has passed and all detectors are available again.  
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Fig. 6. Schematic diagram of DTBS schemes: (a) original scheme, (b) enhanced scheme and 
(c) enhanced scheme for BB84.  Coupler: passive fiber coupler; D.L.1: one time-bin delay; 
D.L.2: two time-bin delay Line; PBS: polarizing beam splitter; DET: single photon detector. 
When separate photon detectors are used for different photon values it’s difficult to build all 
photon detectors with identical efficiency. A detector with higher efficiency would fire more 
frequently than one with lower efficiency. This unbalanced characteristic would cause key 
values to skew more towards one of the values and undermine the randomness of keys. 
Using the single detector DTBS scheme of Fig. 6(c), avoids all these problems.  Futhermore, 
some DTBS schemes are also vulnerable to the TBS intercept-resend attack [Xu, et al., 2006] 
when single photon detectors operate in a gated mode. Some single photon detectors, such 
as InGaAs APDs, can only work in a gated mode, where photons can only be detected in 
specified time windows. DTBS systems with single photon detectors operating in free-
running mode, such as Si-APD, are not susceptible to this attack. 
3.2 Frequency up-conversion for distance 
For QKD systems beyond 10 km, the wavelength of the quantum signal needs be in the 1310 
nm or 1550 nm bands, where the telecom fiber loss is lowest. WDM and erbium-doped fiber 
amplifier (EDFA) technology are widely used in current optical communication links and 
the noise they induce in the 1550 nm band is too high to allow single photon transmission in 
that band on the same fiber. This leaves the 1310 nm band as a compromise for single 
photon transmission that can share (WDM) a fiber with existing 1550 telcom traffic.   
Among the single photon detectors available for the 1310 nm band, InGaAs APDs [Yuan , et 
al., 2007], superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) [Hadfield, et al., 2007] and up-
conversion detectors using Si-APDs [Langrock, et al., 2005] are used to implement high-
speed QKD systems. Recently, a self-difference technique was developed for InGaAs APDs 
that suppresses the afterpulse noise, and it has been successfully applied to a GHz QKD 
system [Yuan, et al., 2008]. The InGaAs APD has about 10% detection efficiency, but it still 
has about 6% afterpulse probability, which would contribute an extra 3% to the QBER of a 
QKD system. SSPDs can operate in the free-running mode and their response time can be 
less than 100 ps. However, SSPDs are expensive and need to be operated at 4º K. Si-APDs 
are low cost, operate at room temperature and have the highest detection efficiency among 
these detectors, but they don’t operate at wavelengths longer than 1000 nm. To alleviate this 
limitation we implemented an up-conversion detector that transforms 1310 nm single 
photons into 710 nm photons for detection by Si-APDs.   
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Fig. 7. Configuration of our up-conversion detectors. PLD: laser diode; EOM: Eelectric-optic 
modulator (LiNbO3); EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier; FLT: optical filter; PC: 
polarization controller; WDM: wavelength-division multiplexer for 1310 nm and 1550 nm; 
PPLN: periodically-poled LiNbO3 waveguide module. 
Our up-conversion detector [Ma, et al., 2009] structure, based on nonlinear optical sum 
frequency generation, is shown in Fig. 7. A 1557 nm CW laser diode (PLD) output is 
modulated to a pulse stream and amplified using an EDFA. A 7 nm (FWHM) optical filter 
(FLT0) is used to suppress the EDFA optical noise between 1000 nm and 1300 nm that can 
induce a large amount of dark counts. After the FLT0, the 1557 nm pulse is divided into 
two streams by a 50:50 coupler to function as a pump for two QKD quantum streams at 
1306 nm. After polarization control is applied, the 1306 nm QKD signals and the 1557 nm 
pump are combined by the WDMs and sent to the periodically-poled LiNbO3 (PPLN) 
waveguide modules where they are up-converted to 710 nm. The output of the PPLN is 
coupled to a 700 nm single mode fiber, which cuts off the strong 1550 nm pump light, and 
is passed to the FLT, which contains a 20 nm band-pass filter and a short-wavelength-pass 
filter, and then finally detected by a Si-APD. This combination of filters helps to attenuate 
the light between 730 nm to 1000 nm by more than 80 dB. The internal quantum 
conversion efficiency of the PPLNs is almost 100%, while the overall efficiency of this up-
conversion detector is about 20%. The coupling loss is significantly larger than those in 
[Langrock, et al., 2005] and degrades the overall detection efficiency. PPLN up-conversion 
is polarization sensitive and can be used as a polarizer, saving a 1 dB loss that a separate 
polarizer would add.  
By using  pulsed light at 1557 nm to pump our 1310 nm signal we reduced the noise and the 
dark counts of our up-conversion detector. The anti-Stokes noise at 1310 is much less than 
the Stokes noise from a pump whose wavelength is longer than our signal wavelength. Also 
a pulsed pump can use the same average power as a continuous one while achieving a 
higher peak power. 
The QKD system performance using our up-conversion detector is shown in Fig. 8. During 
our measurements, the pump power was fixed at 40 mW. The sifted-key rate is 2.5 Mbit/s 
for a back-to-back connection, 1 Mbit/s at 10 km, and 60 kbit/s at 50 km. The QBER is 
approximately 3% back-to-back, remains below 4% up to 20 km, and reaches 8% at 50 km. 
The modulator extinction ratio and system timing jitter induces a background QBER of 
approximately 2.5% and the rest is from dark counts generated by both the pump light and 
the classical channel. We set the pump power close to the maximum up-conversion 
efficiency and the QBER remains small until 20 km due to the low dark count rate of the 
1550 nm up-conversion detector.  
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Fig. 8. The performance of our 1310 nm QKD system using up-conversion detectors.  
4. Programmable hardware and gigahertz signalling 
Because secure video surveillance and other such applications require high speed QKD to 
generate sufficient secure key, this section will discuss the time tagging, synchronization 
and data handling necessary to achieve high speed QKD. We focus on an implementation 
that uses dedicated field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and synchronization 
techniques that enable transmission rates above 1 GHz and avoid some of the data-handling 
bottlenecks that can limit performance. Research has demonstrated that both the throughput 
and the signal to noise ratio on the quantum channel of these systems can be improved by 
operating at high repetition rates and with strong temporal synchronization and gating 
[Gordon, et al., 2005]. It is well known that the benefits of this approach are ultimately 
limited by the temporal resolution of the single-photon detectors [Bienfang, et al., 2006]. 
Available single-photon detector resolution can be below 100 ps (FWHM) [Ghioni, et al., 
2007] and can therefore resolve transmission rates well into the gigahertz regime.  
For QKD systems operating over kilometer-scale links, synchronization with picosecond 
accuracy is most commonly achieved with either clock-distribution techniques [Bienfang, et 
al., 2006], in which synchronization is continuously enforced with active phase-locked-loops 
(PLLs), or with stable Rubidium oscillators, in which occasional resynchronization processes 
ensure accurate and synchronous local clocks [Ling, et al., 2008]. The hardware support we 
discuss in this section focuses on clock-distribution and recovery techniques, mainly because 
PLL systems are commonly incorporated into commercially available data-processing chips.  
With stable synchronization established over the link, detection events can be time tagged 
by identifying where the detector signal’s rising edge occurs with respect to the clock. We 
view the detector signal as if it were a synchronous serial data stream and implement time 
tagging by identifying in which bit period the detector signal makes a transition (e.g. 0 to 1). 
In this approach the serial data rate of the receiver defines the temporal resolution of our 
time-tagging system; for example, a 1.25 Gb/s serial data rate defines 800 ps time bins.  An 
additional advantage of time tagging with a serial data receiver is that the system operates 
continuously with no reset time.  
Our approach is to use existing chips with transceivers for these tasks to capture serial 
signals above a GHz and move into the parallel realm for processing at reduced frequencies. 
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Even at these reduced frequencies, however, feeding the parallel signals into a computer for 
software processing is not a viable option. Software is a sequential set of operations that 
requires a certain number of computer-clock cycles for each set of parallel signals. Even with 
a program designed to operate in the required time period, memory allocations and 
background applications controlled by the operating system may make it impossible to 
guarantee that the necessary amount of processing time would be available for continuous 
signal acquisitions. A 1.25 Gb/s serial signal (800 ps time bins) can be demultiplexed into a 
synchronous 16 bit parallel word stream at 78.125 MHz. Software that seeks to identify 
detection events in such a signal would need to execute every 12.8 ns, and complete before 
the next 12.8 ns time interval. This is challenging even for dedicated real-time computers. A 
10 Gb/s signal (100 ps time bins) would generate a synchronous 32 bit parallel signal at 
312.5 MHz, leaving only 3.2 ns for processing. And there is the additional difficulty of 
developing a hardware interface to continuously load the parallel data into the computer at 
that rate. For such systems, an FPGA board is a flexible approach that can be optimized for a 
given application and connected to a computer via standard high speed interfaces.  
FPGAs can include standard programmable-logic elements, both combinatorial (e.g. AND, 
OR, NOT) and sequential (e.g. Flip-flop), as well as dedicated specialized devices, such as 
memory, digital signal processors (DSPs), and high-speed transceivers. FPGAs allow a user 
to build custom logic sequences that process data acquired from input pins, store the data in 
internal memory and output the data. Detectors and other devices can be connected directly 
to FPGA pins and computers can interface with FPGAs using a variety of standard 
interfaces. FPGA programming is similar to writing a program for a computer, but an FPGA 
allows the user to control both the data size and operations within each clock cycle, whereas 
in a computer the operating system and processor make these choices. Controlling the 
timing sequence becomes an additional “dimension” in programming. Even when the 
FPGA clock rate is low compared to a given computer, operations can be arranged in 
parallel and sequenced into tight groups without interruption to compensate for the lower 
clock rate and achieve comparable or even superior performance.  
FPGAs can be programmed to adjust their level of parallelism, but they do not operate at 
gigahertz rates (yet) and therefore cannot directly process a serial input with sub-
nanosecond time bins. Below 1 ns some degree of parallelization is necessary. As discussed 
above, the faster the input detection stream is sampled by the receiver, the smaller the 
detection time bins become and the greater the necessary parallelization. Organizing the 
processing into a pipeline sequence, like an assembly line in which each operation is 
performed in parallel and a new item can be placed on the assembly line each cycle, allows 
processing times to exceed the time-bin limit. Current FPGAs can operate with a clock rate 
up to about 0.5 GHz, though they typically realize only about 1/3 of that rate for all but 
elementary operations. It is worthwhile to point out that with each new generation of FPGA 
there has been an increase in operational clock rate of about 10%. Fortunately, data input 
and output are typically supported at the maximum specified clock rate, and with dual data 
rate (DDR) capabilities (operating on both the rising and falling clock edges) input and 
output can operate at speeds up to twice the FPGA’s clock rate. By converting a TTL or 
CMOS signal from a single-photon detector to a differential signal, an FPGA could directly 
sample the detector signal with resolution down to about 1 ns.  
Below 1 ns, front-end circuitry is necessary that will sample the signal and present parallel 
data to the FPGA at a lower rate. Using existing gigahertz transceivers, or their fundamental 
core the SerDes (serializer/deserializer), is an attractive choice because they are commonly 
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available chips and they are included in some FPGAs as internal devices. For input data, a 
SerDes uses a clock and data recovery (CDR) circuit to sample a serial data stream and 
recover the clock and data. The SerDes then collects a sequence of the serial bits (in a shift 
register) and then outputs that group of bits in parallel (to a holding register) along with the 
recovered clock divided down to the parallel rate. For example, a 1.25 GHz serial input data 
stream is converted by a SerDes to 10-bit parallel data accompanied by a 125 MHz clock. 125 
MHz is much more suited to FPGA processing rates and each parallel data item can be 
processed in a pipelined manner to maintain a continuous flow of time-tagging data. 
One drawback to this approach is that the input serial data stream to a SerDes must be 
continuous and have sufficient data transitions (balanced) for the internal PLLs to recover the 
embedded clock. Most single-photon detector signals are random and sparse, with no 
guaranteed transition interval. For this application, we use additional circuitry to piggyback 
the single-photon-detector signal onto the known classical channel signal by an exclusive-OR 
(XOR) before the SerDes as shown in Fig. 9. A similar XOR operation is performed a second 
time, inside the FPGA, to recover the original detector signal. Thus the balanced classical 
channel signal provides the timing for the detection stream. It is the rising edge of the detector 
signal that indicates the arrival time of a photon (the pulse can be given a conveniently long 
duration provided it does not limit the maximum count rate of the detector). It is the bit period 
of the classical channel that determines the resolution of the time tags recorded for each single-
photon detection event. Finally, time tagging requires a mutual reference event between 
source and destination that can be used to identify common time bins. This configuration 
allows such events to be sent over the classical channel, as a predetermined measage. 
This approach assumes synchronous signals that are stable when sampled during each clock 
period. All synchronous electronic devices specify setup (time before the clock edge) and 
hold (time after the clock edge) times relative to the clock edge when the data must be 
stable. When the signal is not stable during that period, the output is not deterministic and 
could result in a metastable [On-Semi, 2007; Unger, 1995; Kleeman & Cantoni, 1987] or 
undetermined state. This can result in the rising edge being assigned to either of the adjacent 
time bins somewhat randomly and could add to the overall timing jitter of the system 
resulting in an increased QBER, and hence fewer usable keys. For this reason the detection 
time bin should be chosen to be larger than the maximum detector jitter.  
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Fig. 9. Piggybacking the sparse signal from a single-photon detector on top of a balanced 
serial data stream allows the SerDes receiving the single-photon detection events to 
synchronize to the clock of the balanced data stream. The data and the received clock (Rcv 
clk) are passed to the FPGA, where the piggybacking signal is removed from the detection 
signal in a parallel format.  
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We developed a pair of custom PCB for our GHz-rate QKD system [Mink, et al., 2006], the 
more complex Bob board shown in Fig. 10. Alice’s board is similar, but since its quantum 
channel is all transmit outputs, it doesn’t need the additional front-end receiver logic. To 
implement the BB84 QKD protocol, we require interfaces for four single-photons detectors. 
The piggybacking scheme of Fig. 9 is used to sample the detector signal at gigahertz rates 
and bring it into an FPGA for processing. However, applying Fig. 9 directly results in 
unstable operation because the jitter in the detector signal can cause transitions at non-
regular intervals of the clock. The resulting signal can violate setup and hold times of the 
SerDes sampling circuit, as discussed above, and potentially cause an unrecoverable 
metastable condition in the sampling circuit. To avoid this situation we use additional 
circuitry to stabilize the detector signal, as shown in Fig. 10: two flip-flops (FFs) triggered by 
the clock recovered from our classical channel. The second FF is necessary because the 
detector signal can cause instability in the first FF, though it will recover by the next clock 
edge. We also use two programmable delays: the first aligns the detector signal to the FF 
clock to minimize the instability in the first FF, the second compensates for the phase 
difference between the FF output and the clock of the classical stream entering the XOR. 
Although the clocks driving the FFs are frequency synchronized to the classical stream, they 
are out of phase due to signal propagation delays on the PCB. 
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Fig. 10. Schematic of a custom PCB used for QKD experiments. Four single-photon detector 
channels are recovered using the piggybacking scheme in Fig. 9. Metastability due to 
detector jitter is avoided with the synchronizing components before the XOR. All four 
single-photon detector inputs are treated in this manner; only one circuit is illustrated. 
The SerDes chip used in this system can support four duplex channels. Each SerDes has one 
input clock (Tx clk) for all four of its transmit streams, and a separate recovered clock for 
each receive stream. The two main clocks used by the FPGA are its local clock and the clock 
recovered from the classical channel. Although these two clocks are nominally 125 MHz, 
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they are only accurate to within 10-4 and are asynchronous to each other. The local clock 
drives the classical channel transmit stream while the recovered clock from the classical 
channel is fed to both the FPGA and the quantum channel SerDes. The quantum SerDes 
uses the classical channel recovered clock to transmit the static 10-bit pattern “1010101010,” 
thus producing a 625 MHz clock. We then double this clock to 1.25 GHz to trigger the FFs 
synchronously with the classical data stream. Each parallel receive stream from the 
quantum channel SerDes is fed to the FPGA, along with its own recovered 125 MHz clock, 
mesochronous to each other and the classical channel. In the FPGA each recovered clock is 
used to store its associated incoming parallel data stream into dual ported first-in first-outs 
(FIFOs) that use separate clocks for input and output and can be asynchronous to each 
other. The FIFOs are capable of synchronizing the data between these two clock domains. 
We have built systems using SerDes that are external components connected to the FPGA 
via PCB traces (c.f. Fig. 10), and more recent implementations [Mink 2007] in which the 
SerDes are internal to the FPGA package. Internal SerDes saves board space, but in either 
implementation the interface between the SerDes and the FPGA logic is similar. In most 
FPGAs the user can configure the operational parameters of internal SerDes. For example, 
we can change the serial speed of the SerDes to a few predefined points in the range from 
1.25 GHz to 6.25 GHz by reprogramming the FPGA.  
In addition to timing, the classical channel carries messages to implement the sifting 
process, where Bob sends its detection events to Alice and Alice returns only the valid ones 
to Bob. At 1.25 GHz (800 ps detector time-bin resolution) we have achieved a performance 
of over 4 Mb/s of sifted-key [Tang, et al., 2006], see Fig. 8. Electrical tests have shown the 
PCBs to have a capacity in excess of 40 Mb/s, though our detectors cannot currently support 
this rate. This processing reduces the data stream from Gb/s to Mb/s and the resulting 
sifted-key data stream has no real-time processing constraints; attributes that are attractive 
for further processing by a computer. 
 
 
Fig. 11. The maximum processing rate of our EC & PA software implementation (black) as a 
function of the QBER. For this test the algorithms are running on a typical desktop 
processor, and sifted bits (blue) are provided as fast as the algorithm can process them (i.e. 
the output is not limited by the input rate). 
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Fig. 12. Performance of our 1.25 GHz free-space QKD system, with the custom PCBs shown 
in Fig. 10, as a function of link loss. As the optical link losses decrease the high throughput 
rises until the EC & PA algorithms saturate at about 55% loss.  
Once the sifting process has been carried out, subsequent reconciliation and privacy 
amplification (EC & PA) can be implemented in software or hardware. Reconciliation also 
requires a classical channel, but it doesn’t need to be the same one used by the lower two 
QKD protocol stages. The processing rate of our software implementation is strongly 
dependant on computer speed. Fig. 11 shows the maximum output rate of our software EC 
& PA implementation, as a function of the QBER, when running on a standard desktop 
system. Our current QKD system can saturate this software implementation. Fig. 12 shows 
the results from a QKD free-space experiment with a quantum channel transmission rate of 
1.25 GHz at 850 nm using Si-APDs. As the link loss is reduced, the sifted-key rate and the 
EC & PA rates increase and the QBER decreases. At 55% loss and below, rather than 
continuing to increase, the EC & PA rate reaches a constant value just over 1 Mb/s due to 
the saturation of our software EC & PA, which in this case is running on a dual-processor 
machine. The saturation causes the transmit board to wait until space is available before 
resuming transmission in the quantum channel, resulting in a relatively constant sifted-key 
rate below 55% link loss. The QBER is not affected. Newer FPGAs now in use are large 
enough to include our EC & PA algorithms on the chip, but require extensive programming 
to implement them. The FPGA programming is too extensive to discuss here. On this 
system, with 1% QBER we have achieved EC & PA secure key rate in excess of 12 Mb/s, 
significantly greater than the ≈1 Mb/s of our computer software version. To sustain that rate 
requires a sifted-key rate of ≈15 Mb/s. Our current QKD systems are not able to reach the 
capacity of this hardware implementation. A further benefit of this hardware 
implementation is that it removes the significant processing required by the EC & PA 
algorithms from the CPU and opens those cycles to applications, such as surveillance video. 
There are a number of standard high-speed interfaces available for transferring data from an 
FPGA to a computer. As with FPGA processing one can not expect to achieve the rated 
throughput; 1/3 to 1/2 of the maximum rated speed is typical. Implementing sifting on the 
PCB significantly reduces the data rate between PCB and computer, which for us is less than 
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10 Mb/s. Our QKD board supports a Gb/s PCI interface and a 480 Mb/s USB computer 
interface. The PCI interface is a 32-bit parallel data interface that runs at 33 MHz. The USB is 
a high-speed serial interface and an external USB chip on the PCB provides the serial-to-
parallel interface and interacts with the FPGA at 33 MHz with 16-bit parallel data. The QKD 
boards also have an external 65-bit interface (64 data bits plus a clock bit) that allows multi-
Gb/s of random number data to be streamed to the FPGA. Operating at 16 MHz, this 
interface can supply the PCB at a Gb/s. Operating at 160 MHz, this interface can supply the 
PCB at 10 Gb/s, but at this rate signal integrity may become a concern. 
We have found these PCBs to provide a stable and reconfigurable platform for QKD as well 
as other single-photon experiments. The gigahertz sampling interfaces, the synchronization 
between source and detector, and the re-programmability of the controlling FPGA, has 
allowed us to reconfigure these boards for various QKD implementations as well as 
correlated-photon measurement experiments. 
5. Quantum networks and a surveillance video application 
Video surveillance usually encompasses more than a single site, but the QKD protocol was 
designed for a point-to-point implementation. Extending this technology to form quantum 
(or QKD) networks makes it more attractive to such applications. A QKD network is an 
embedded sub-network within a conventional communication network for the purpose of 
developing shared secrets, not transporting secure messages. The secure messages are 
transported on the conventional communication network. The quantum and classical 
channels may be dedicated or they can share (via WDM) the existing physical network links 
of the conventional network, but the quantum channels must have an end-to-end 
transparent optical path between each QKD node. Building QKD networks and integrating 
them into conventional networks that support traditional security protocols, and other 
applications, and use existing network infrastructure is an important step towards the 
practical deployment of these systems. For deployable systems additional services are 
required, such as network management and key management with an application interface. 
There are two types of QKD networks, passive and active. Passive networks use passive 
optical components (e.g. the optical coupler) to implement multi-user connectivity. Passive 
networks can realize multi-terminal communications simultaneously, or “broadcast” from 
one node to multiple nodes. Several groups have successfully demonstrated a passive QKD 
network [Phoenix, et al., 1995; Townsend, et al., 1994; Fernandez, et al., 2007]. However, in a 
passive network, the photons are split by couplers according to their coupling ratio and 
distributed proportionally to each node, resulting in a proportionally reduced key rate 
between each node. The second type adopts active optical components, such as optical 
switches, to dynamically control the communication path. This type is similar to current 
switched optical communication networks, and establishes a reconfigurable QKD link. 
Switching time and QKD link initialization are the main overhead factors. Optical switches 
have been investigated in QKD systems [Toliver, et al., 2003], and demonstrated by BBN 
Technologies [Elliott, et al., 2005] and NIST [Ma, et al., 2007] but only the NIST system is fast 
enough to support a one-time pad cipher for video.    
A potential solution to extend QKD over longer distances is to chain together a number of 
QKD links. This approach requires that all intermediate nodes be trusted and secure because 
the key must be one-time pad transported, in multiple hops, across each additional QKD 
link to the communication end point, exposing the key at each node. In some cases this may 
www.intechopen.com
An Application of Quantum Networks for Secure Video Surveillance  
 
91 
be acceptable, it depends on the security requirements. For example, this may be acceptable 
in a corporate application where each node resides within a secure corporate controlled 
location.  This is also applicable to quantum networks where each node cannot be directly 
connected to each other, such as in a mesh network vs. a star configuration. This also allows 
the use of non-switched quantum networks where the QKD links are static, such as in the 
SECOQC network [Peev, et al., 2009]. An example of this multi-hop approach is shown in 
Fig. 13. There are three QKD links, A-B, C-D and E-F, in a quantum network that connect 
nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4. QKD link ends B and C are co-located in the same node as are D and E. If 
we want to send a message from node 1 to node 4, encrypted with QKD key(a), then we 
need to get key(a) to node 4, but it exists only on Nodes 1 and 2. So node 2 gets key(c) from 
QKD link C-D and One-Time Pad encrypts key(a) with key(c) and then sends that encrypted 
key(ac) as a message to node 3. Node 3 decrypts it using key(c), extracting the original 
key(a). Node 3 then gets key(e) from QKD link E-F and One-Time Pad encrypts key(a) with 
key(e) and then sends that encrypted key(ae) as a message to node 4. Node 4 decrypts it 
using key(e), extracting the original key(a).  
QKD systems produce a database of ordered secure bits at each end of a QKD link. A key 
manager, as shown in Fig. 1, is needed to demultiplex and synchronize these QKD bits for 
various applications, including conventional network security applications such as IPSec 
and TLS.  Demultiplexing divides up the bits in the database into multiple independent key 
streams for each application. Synchronization makes sure that the same bits, in the same 
order, are allocated to the same demultiplexed stream on both sides of the network 
connection. Key management is easier for point-to-point QKD links, but becomes more 
complex for networks with trusted intermediate nodes since all node combinations must be 
accommodated. Key management also requires a mechanism to detect and recover from loss 
of synchronization. The key management application interface, operating within the 
security perimeter of each local node, would require its peers, as well as applications and 
their peers, to share a common, unique ID in order to retrieve the proper corresponding key. 
An application can have as many IDs as desired so it can implement virtual, independent 
key streams. For example, one for outgoing messages and another for incoming messages.  
 
 
Fig. 13. Example of QKD multi-hop mechanism across 3 QKD links, A-B, C-D, and E-F 
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Since duplicate secret keys are kept at the respective ends of the channel, there is always a 
concern that some bits may be dropped or corrupted. A few corrupted bits will ruin a key, 
but future keys will not be affected. A few dropped bits, however, can be disastrous. Since 
the keys exist as an ordered set of random bits duplicated at each end of the link, if any bits 
are dropped at one end and not the other then all future key streams will differ at their 
respective ends and all future encrypted messages will be undecodeable. 
Recovery from a few corrupted bits can be accomplished by discarding that key and 
obtaining a new key. Preventing such an occurrence can be accomplished by exchanging an 
error detection hash code for each group of keys transferred at QKD stages. For example, 
when 1 Mbit of key is transferred from the reconciliation stage to the privacy amplification 
stage a 64-bit hash code is exchanged to verify their equivalence. If the codes don’t match, 
then that entire group of keys will be discarded. The key manager can take similar actions. 
At each QKD stage, steps are taken to prevent loss of key synchronization. If high error rates 
are detected, then the QKD link is reset and restarted. This detects and corrects both 
corrupted and dropped bits. The secure keys can be labeled by their ordered bit position in 
the secure key database and the key manager can exchange that information to keep its 
reserved and multiplexed bit groups synchronized for the applications. 
Quantum network management features include controlling the switches, handling routing 
and verifying that the referenced node does have a currently operational QKD link that can 
be reached from the current node. Complications arise when switching (vs. static links) is 
required, because QKD uses circuit switching that requires 10s of seconds to switch, 
initialize and produce usable keys. Furthermore, periodic adjustments of the quantum 
channel may be necessary that would cause temporary interruption of the QKD link. 
Fig. 14 shows the NIST active, switched quantum network. It has 3 nodes (Alice, Bob1 and 
Bob2) in a star configuration and uses commercial MEMS optical switches for the quantum 
and classical channels.  The system operates at a 1.25 Gbps clock rate and can provide more 
than 1 Mb/s sifted-key rate over 1 km of optical fiber. As part of this QKD network, we have 
developed a quantum network manager and a key manager with an application interface 
similar to that discussed above. To demonstrate the speed of this QKD system, we have 
developed a video surveillance application, see Fig. 14, that is secured by a one-time pad 
cipher using keys generated by this quantum network and transmitted over standard 
internet IP channels. Two Bobs, at two different locations, are each equipped with a 
monitoring video camera, and are linked to Alice, who resides at the surveillance 
monitoring station, through this switched quantum network and the internet. A benefit of a 
one-time pad cipher is the simple encryption/decryption algorithm that adds little overhead 
to an application, since it’s a bit-by-bit XOR operation of the data stream with the key 
stream. This, and the QKD hardware support, allows the available CPU cycles to be focused 
on video surveillance processing and not key and cipher processing. 
Our surveillance application uses commercial webcams and an open source media encoder 
and player, all of which run on standard Windows based PCs. Each webcam output is 
processed by the media encoder and sends a UDP video data stream to its attached Bob 
(Linux) machine. Only one Bob (i.e., Bob1 or Bob2) at a time is active and connected to Alice 
through the switch. Our encryption application, running on the active Bob, receives the 
video stream as well as a stream of secure keys from its local QKD key manager, see Fig. 1, 
and performs a one-time pad encryption on the video stream. The now encrypted video 
stream is sent over the internet to Alice, also a Linux machine. Our decryption application, 
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Fig. 14. A Video Surveillance application secured by the NIST QKD network and a one-time 
pad cipher. Network diagram (left) and actual nodes (right).  
running on Alice, receives the encrypted TCP video stream as well as the matching 
synchronized stream of secure keys from its local QKD key manager. It then uses the key 
stream to decrypt the video stream and sends the clear text video as a UDP stream to its 
attached Windows based PC, which is running the media player that displays the video on 
the PC monitor. The result is continuous video displayed from the webcam, although 
delayed by a few seconds. Each Windows/Linux machine pair is within a local security 
perimeter and can be replaced by a single machine by porting the necessary software. When 
a user at Alice’s monitor chooses to switch the video between Bob1 and Bob2, the QKD 
protocol flow to the active Bob is terminated and his secure key pool is conserved for when 
we switch back to him. The inactive Bob’s QKD protocol flow is started up. The inactive Bob 
will start to send encrypted video to Alice using any conserved secure keys in its database, 
otherwise it will stall until its QKD starts to generate keys. An alternative approach to a 
secure video application would be to integrate the QKD key manager with a conventional 
network security application, such as IPsec, TLS or a link encryptor. The benefits being a 
vetted security application and greater portability for the surveillance application. 
6. Standards activities 
For any significant QKD commercial market penetration, standards are necessary for 
consumer understanding and verification, and for manufacturers’ requirements. Because the 
QKD community is small, in comparison with the Internet community, only a single initial 
standards effort could be supported. That effort has been undertaken by the European 
Technology Standards Institute (ETSI) [Laenger & Lenhart, 2009] with worldwide 
participation. Delegates come from academia, research centers and industry. The intent of 
these standards is far reaching. They will need to include definitions and characterization of 
components (e.g., sources, detectors, random number generators, etc.) as well as the overall 
system. They will also need to include the metrology necessary to verify component and 
system operation, and testing to verify conformance to operational and security 
specifications. Furthermore, standard interfaces are necessary to integrate and interoperate 
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with existing infrastructure, components and applications. The job is a big one and this 
standards group is mapping out this complex space. The group was started at the end of 
2008 and to complete the underlying work necessary to support these standards and the 
time to develop the standards will easily take a number of years and will require significant 
effort from all the member organizations. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed the QKD protocol and its potential to secure video 
surveillance applications. We have shown examples of a QKD implementation along with 
references to other implementations. We have also shown some innovations that can reduce 
QKD costs, limit some of the side channel attacks and provide hardware support to off load 
CPU processing. In addition, we have discussed the expansion of QKD into quantum 
networks and the concern and complexities associated with trusted intermediate nodes. We 
also touched on the need for integration with existing network infrastructure, providing 
services necessary for deployment and an on-going standards effort that is needed by both 
customers and developers. QKD is an attractive technology that holds significant promise 
but requires substantial research to bring it to fruition. QKD may not develop into a viable 
widely deployable technology, but with on-going research at least niche applications have 
potential. 
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